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Abstract 
This article is concerned with the possibility of conceiving a form a social critique 
that has its locus in the human body. Therefore I engage in a close reading of the 
(later) work of Butler which can be analyzed as an elaboration of a Foucauldian 
critical ‘virtue’. In order to elaborate and to refine my ideas  I go deeper into the 
criticisms McNay has uttered regarding the very impossibility of taking any 
distance from a given social or political order within a Foucauldian-Butlerian 
framework. I show that there is no need to have recourse to a phenomenological 
perspective, as McNay claims, in order to achieve ‘critical distance’. On the contrary, 
I argue that it is imperative to explore a register of bodily experience that entails 
self-expropriation and which is linked to an attitude or ‘ethos’ that renounces any 
judgmental perspective. 
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The (im)possibility of a Foucauldian idea of critique  
Ever since Michel Foucault introduced the notion ‘biopower’ (Foucault, 1978) to the 
field of philosophy and the social sciences, the human body has become a major focus 
of research. In Foucault’s view our bodies are, since the advent of Modernity, 
increasingly shaped or subjugated by techniques of normalization, control and 
(self)discipline. This is to say that, whilst formerly power was exerted over 
territories (implying the power of the sovereign over the death of the subjects living 
on this territory), the Modern era is characterized by a growing seizure of power 
over life, in its most detailed aspects: our bodies have more and more become the 
object of a governance that aims at turning us into (more) reliable, predictable and 
productive beings. Therefore, according to this line of thought, anyone concerned 
with processes and mechanisms of social regulation – as well as the possibilities to 
resist or alter existing frames of social regulation – should pay attention to the 
political meaning of the body. This perspective not only stresses the importance of 
corporeality for understanding how subjectivity is constituted and social existence is 
organized. The most important implication is that we should give the body its fair 
share if we want to take a critical distance vis-à-vis the established social and 
political order (the organization of our communal life according to categories of 
identity and hierarchically defined roles), as well as the discursive regimes that 
support it. 
This connection between corporeality and critique is the central issue in this 
article. More specifically, I defend an idea of critique that has its locus in a qualified 
form of corporeal experience. I substantiate this claim on the basis of the most 
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recent oeuvre of Judith Butler, a philosopher who is not only famous for proclaiming 
that bodies do matter, but who has also been engaged in a long and profound 
dialogue with Foucault. In a sense, her latest work can be read as a reply to the very 
question what it means to be critical (vis-à-vis a given order of things), in which she 
consistently develops a Foucauldian stance. Although Butler is more known for her 
contributions to the field of feminism and queer theory (which is the explicit focus of 
her earlier work), the scope of the Butlerian approach I develop in this article is 
much broader and actually concerns every form of social criticism. Nevertheless, my 
argument is based on a criticism of the views defended by Lois McNay, a prominent 
and contemporary feminist philosopher. This is not so much because the issue of 
women’s oppression/emancipation is the main focus of this article, but because 
McNay discredits any attempt to develop a critical stance on the basis of the work of 
Foucault. Moreover, although many other (feminist) theorists have uttered similar 
criticisms (e.g. Fraser, 1989; Hartsock, 1990), I concentrate on McNay’s point of 
view, precisely because she treats Butler as a representative par excellence of a 
Foucauldian framework (Cf. McNay, 1999, 2000, 2003 & 2004). Therefore, my 
discussion and refutation of McNay’s position are meant to underline the potential, 
as well as the originality of a Butlerian concept of critique. 
McNay acknowledges Foucault as a major resource for social critical theory 
and, from her earliest writings on (e.g. McNay, 1991), she actually takes sides with 
Foucault for his insights into the entanglement of corporeality and social oppression. 
After all, over and against the tendency, typical for mainstream western philosophy, 
to take for granted self-conscious subjectivity as an immaculate, stable and trans-
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historical foundation, Foucault has drawn attention to the historically contingent 
circumstances (i.e. discursive, material and technological conditions) that structure 
processes of subject-formation, and more precisely to the way in which power seizes 
control over the body and imposes, via the body, various kinds of subjectivity. 
Nonetheless, McNay also accuses Foucault of a structural weakness in his way of 
thinking: ‘[t]he emphasis that Foucault places on the effects of power upon the body 
results in a reduction of social agents to passive bodies and cannot explain how 
individuals may act in an autonomous fashion’ (1991, p. 125). Therefore it remains 
unintelligible for her how resistance towards social and political regimes might 
actually be possible.   
McNay argues, more precisely, that a Foucauldian perspective lacks a 
sufficient idea of agency (i.e. the autonomous capacity for (subversive) action) and 
that it therefore doesn’t allow to conceive a serious conception of criticality. Next to 
this, she finds it problematic that Foucault omits any reference to (bodily) 
experience. For Foucault, as a post-structuralist philosopher, any recourse to 
experience is by definition unreliable: experience only seems to offer a direct access 
to (corporeal) reality, and more often than not this alleged purity and authenticity 
conceal that experience is determined or even constructed by a given discursive 
regime. As such, this regime is indirectly supported. If Foucault is right on this 
point, this would imply – so McNay claims – that the oppressive situation she, as a 
feminist, fights against is only to be reproduced in the end. Or:  ‘[w]hereas feminists 
have recognized the need to show that women are more than passive victims of 
domination – through the rediscovery and re-valuation of their experiences and 
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history – Foucault’s understanding of individuals as passive bodies has the effect, 
albeit unintentional, of pushing women back into this position of passivity and 
silence’ (Ibid., p. 137). In sum, as the result of an overestimation concerning the 
impact of power regimes on the body, a lack of any substantial idea of agency, and of 
a deep mistrust vis-à-vis (bodily) experience as a potentially emancipatory force, 
Foucault leaves no room for taking distance from the way social existence is ordered 
(viz. on the basis of male/heterosexual hegemony).   
McNay claims furthermore that we need to complete this view with a 
phenomenological  perspective. Originally, this school of thought tried to elucidate 
everything we think, feel and do on the basis of concrete experiences of the 
‘transcendental subject’. This is to say that our consciousness, by relating to others 
and to the world (i..e. according to the original modus of ‘intentionality’), is the 
source of  all meaning. McNay is especially interested in contemporary versions of 
phenomenolgy, which - in line with Merleau-Ponty’s work (1995) - see the ‘corps-
sujet’, i.e. the subject as a fully bodily self, as source primary locus of meaning and 
intentionality. In her view, Bourdieu’s ‘social phenomenology’ (2000) might do this 
job. However, in this contribution I argue that there is no need whatsoever to appeal 
to a phenomenological approach for conceiving the possibility of critique. On the 
contrary, the work of Foucault and Butler offers itself opportunities for this. First, 
these thinkers argue for a possibility to distance oneself from and to resist current 
orderings of social life which precisely demands that we transcend any notion of 
agency, at least in any traditional meaning of this expression. To see this, a 
particular ‘critical ethos’ is required (Foucault, 1984). Second, critical distance is, 
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according to them, precisely realized when one is willing to go through a moment of 
‘limit-experience’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 31). As I show throughout this contribution, 
Butler, in her more recent oeuvre, locates this potential for social and political 
change in the bodily experience of exposure. 
In the next part of this article I first turn to the earlier work of Butler, and 
more specifically, the ideas she defends there regarding identity formation on the 
basis of performativity and reiteration. This will help me to refine, in the next two 
parts, McNay’s precise objections against the position Foucault and Butler take 
regarding the possibility of critique, and to show that McNay’s approach is based on 
a very partial reading of Butler’s oeuvre (dealing solely with a specific set of texts 
that are not representative for the whole of Butler’s thinking). In the last parts, I 
then develop a Foucauldian-Butlerian framework that leaves room for an effective 
form of criticality - without any need to  refer to phenomenology.  
 
Butler’s theory of performative subject-constitution 
The core of McNay’s criticism concerns Butler’s influential books from the 90’s (e.g. 
Butler 1990, 1993, 1997a &1997b), which are shown to possess a weaknesses 
characteristic of Foucauldian perspectives (and of the post-structuralist paradigm in 
general). In the aforementioned texts Butler develops a discursive model of identity 
formation and social structure. At the basis of this model there is the idea, first, that 
there is no subjectivity prior to symbolic categories that form the cornerstone of a 
given social and political order. Second, there is the idea that the coming into being 
of subjectivity (as a stable form of identity) is the result of the repetitive 
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performance of these categories in our daily conduct. This means that subjectivity is 
never a starting point (as was taken for granted by most traditional western 
philosophies), but always the result of, on the one hand, categorizations that precede 
the level of the individual being, and, on the other hand, the ritual repetition of 
these categories.  
To be clear on this point, this is not to say that there are first pre-existing 
roles such as ‘male’ or ‘female’, ‘straight’ or ‘queer’, ‘white’ or ‘black’ which we 
subsequently take on: there is no ‘we’ before or behind subjectification. Or, as 
Nietzsche remarks, there is no doer behind the deed (Butler, 1990, p. 13). There is 
no identity outside ritual performance. It is only through the enactment of such 
roles that something like a ‘we’ might come into being. It is only by performing these 
categorizations that they become real and produce our identities. The existence of a 
social order and the distribution of different identities and hierarchical positions 
within that order is thus wholly dependent upon the constant repetition or even 
better re-enactment of specific roles and their consolidated meanings: performing 
these roles again and again a social order gets reproduced. 
In view of this analysis it is useless to turn to ‘the subject’ in order to conceive 
of a possible transformation of a given order or of any form of resistance against an 
unjust or oppressive (e.g. heteronormative) organization of social existence. After all, 
for Butler there is no undefiled core of subjectivity that exists independently of the 
given identities that are mandated under specific social and political regimes. 
Consequentially any form of opposition that pretends to act on behalf of such a 
repressed essence of humankind is doomed from the start to fail, for it will assume a 
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fiction that serves only to sustain the existing order of things. After all, the 
continuous repetition of certain behavioural patterns might generate the idea of 
something ‘originary’ behind our performances, but this is only a ‘false stabilisation’ 
(Butler, 1990, p. 172) of identity. Moreover, believing that such a foundational self 
exists might cause the illusion of being able to detach ourselves from regulatory 
norms. 
Nevertheless, it is also the dependency of an existing order on the reiteration 
of certain roles that precisely implies the possibility of a deviation of regulatory 
norms and thus the promise of real transformation. Since iterability is an infinite 
process of rehearsal, it is also undeterminable. This is to say that the citational 
character of identity-constitution also renders it decontextualisable, offering the 
possibility of parodic recitation and thus of counter-hegemonic practices. Drag 
illustrates  a real and effective destabilization and contestation of the existing 
regime (Ibid., p. 174). This practice makes abundantly clear that every identity, also 
the ‘normal’ ones, is mere performance, and nothing but that. In other words: 
because an existing social regime always relies on concrete bodily acts of 
individuals, precisely here resides the very possibility of opposition and change. 
Corporeality appears, according to this view, at the same time as the very 
bearer of identity formation (it is as bodies that we keep a discursive regime in 
operation) and as a site of resistance and potential change (it is as bodies that we 
might destabilize the existing regulative norms that produce stable identities). 
However, analogous to the way in which there exists no subjectivity outside of a 
regime of categorizations, the body has no real existence outside discursive 
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structures and regulative practices (Butler, 1990, p. 24). The whole idea that there 
would exist something like ‘a body as such’ is not only unintelligible, it is also quite 
dangerous. This is because this view makes us believe that there is an eternal 
substance called ‘the body’, whilst withdrawing from view the contingent conditions 
that make us have a particular conception of the body. For the same reason it is also 
problematic to speak about an immediate bodily experience that would offer direct 
access to the realm of corporeality.  
Two nuances should be made at this point. First, although Butler has often 
been reproached to claim the opposite, her view doesn’t exclude all form of agency. 
In her oeuvre there clearly is a notion of anti-essentialist, performative agency at 
work. It is, more precisely a form of agency that is fully to be located at the level of 
bodily action. Second, even if corporeality is conceived as an effect of a discursive 
order, this doesn’t preclude that bodies really do matter. Butler’s approach in the 
texts I mentioned doesn’t deny that we may actually do something of positive 
political impact with our bodies. On the contrary, transfigurative bodily practices 
and gender parody possess a real subversive potential. Furthermore, it doesn’t make 
sense to deny that we also are biological realities, the functions and structures of 
which are described and explained by the natural sciences. However, any attempt to 
conceive this factual reality, already implies that one has to rely on language and 
thus that one finds oneself - and one’s body - objectified according to a given 
discursive order. So one never has direct and unmediated contact with ‘the body’, 
even if it is maintained ‘that we are our bodies’ (biologically spoken). Corporeality 
unavoidably escapes full grasp (see Butler, 2001). So, the question regarding the 
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precise relation between physical existence and identity/subjectivity is a non-
decidable one. 
 
McNay’s plea for a phenomenological account of agency 
McNay’s basic opposition to Butler’s approach is that a conception of agency in 
terms of performative body-acts lacks substance and efficacy. It concerns 
 
not an account of agency per se, but an account of some of the 
discursive pre-conditions that must prevail for certain types of 
linguistic innovation to be possible […]. The possibility of linguistic 
agency is linked to the reiterative structure of language itself but this is 
a necessary and not a sufficient account of agency. Butler posits agency 
as a property of language conceived as an abstract structure, rather 
than as a situated type of action or interaction. This conception of 
agency is problematic because it does not adequately address central 
features of agency as intention and reflexivity. […] Ultimately, the 
conflation of an idea of agency with the idea of instability within 
meaning systems results in a symbolic determinism […] (McNay, 2004, 
p. 182) 
 
In other words, Butler might well have identified circumstances that create 
opportunities for resistance and change, but her analysis is not in itself sufficient for 
understanding that subjects might effectively distance themselves from the 
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identities and positions that are conferred upon them inside a given discursive 
regime: even if the fundamental instability of the reiterative processes of subject-
constitution leaves an opening for escaping an oppressive order, it remains 
unintelligible how this process of transformation can ever be appropriated by the 
resisting subject as her own ‘act’. For Butler, ‘[a]gency is a quality of structures 
rather than subjects’ (2003, p. 143). In spite of her attempt to rescue some form of 
agency, Butler tends to a form of linguistic determinism, presupposing an ‘essential 
passivity of the subject’ (Ibid., p. 140) 
Or, so McNay argues, sustained that Butler tries to conceive the possibility of 
‘changing’ the given order of things, this is always conceived in a purely negative 
manner: she ‘tends to conceive of action mainly through the residual categories of 
resistance to, or the dislocation of, dominant norms’  (Ibid.). Such action, again, is 
not the result of an ability inherent to the subject, but is wholly dependent upon 
existing (unjust and oppressive) structures: distance and opposition only have 
meaning in view of the negation of a reality to which it remains dependent in the 
end. Therefore there is no possibility of real change. McNay even argues that we 
might spur here some reminiscences of the ‘voluntarism’ of the later writings of 
Foucault (Ibid., p. 141). The reverse side of an exaggerated view on the impact of 
discursive regimes, is that any possibility of contestation is always understood as 
something extremely reactive and violent: it is as if we are either completely 
constrained by the symbolic realm or that we should escape it by an act of the most 
radical subversion (Ibid., p. 144), which in the end presupposes a merely negative 
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account of agency (the only real form of agency consists in an unreserved negation of 
the existing, i.e. resistance for the sake of resistance). 
Therefore, McNay continues, a more positive and substantive idea of agency is 
required. This also means that we should look for an alternative theoretical 
framework, which McNay calls ‘hermeneutic’ (2003) and ‘phenomenological’ (2004). 
This point of view allows to conceive agency no longer ‘as the indeterminacy of 
symbolic structures’ (which might well be a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition), but ‘as a social practice’ (McNay, 2003, p. 143). At the same time, the 
identities and roles we take should be thought in terms of ‘lived social relations’ 
instead of as ‘locations within discursive structures’ (McNay, 2004, p. 183).  
According to McNay, this alternative perspective might be found in the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu. 
This reference might seem odd, as Bourdieu is mostly interpreted as a 
defender of a stringent social determinism. Evidently, Bourdieu is also interested in 
the ways in which corporeality supports existing social regimes, stressing the role of 
pre-reflexive corporeal dispositions (habitus) that keep existing distinctions between 
dominant and underprivileged groups intact (Bourdieu, 1992). For instance, the 
embodied know-how regarding the right things to say when being confronted with a 
work of art or what clothes to wear during a social event, constitutes an 
unsurpassable border between various classes. But, this also seems to imply that 
there exists only a ‘unidirectional causality’ (McNay, 2004, p. 180) from the pre-
given social field to the individual level: the objective social structures we live in 
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constrain us almost mechanically, meaning that the opportunity for the slightest 
deviation is excluded a priori. 
However, this criticism is only valid at the surface, because Bourdieu’s 
analysis actually presupposes a complex concept of agency (Cf. Ibid., p. 181). And 
this is, not unsurprisingly, because Bourdieu stresses the mediating role of 
experience and reflexivity. Although distance in social positions is indeed sustained 
by corporeal dispositions, ‘[t]his process of inscription does not attribute determining 
priority to structures over representations, because it is conceived as a generative 
rather than determining process’ (Ibid., p. 184). This is to say that Bourdieu 
attributes an important role to the symbolic representation of those aspects of 
(embodied) life that are structured by the social field (such as know-how, clothing 
and speaking styles, cultural competence). Precisely the role of representation 
guarantees an element of ’uncertainty’ and therefore there is room left for action and 
contestation. To be clear on this point, this is not to reintroduce an ontological 
concept of ‘the subject’, which clearly follows from Bourdieu’s preference to speak 
about ‘social agents’ (See Bourdieu, 1992, p. 137 as discussed by McNay, 2003, p. 
143). 
According to such a view, identities are always more than merely a position 
within an objective social structure. They are lived social relations: granted that 
there is a ‘structuring structure’ that precedes identity-formation (i.e. social 
relations), identity only has meaning in so far it is something we actually experience 
(i.e. lived social relations). As such, it is possible to reintroduce the vital concept 
experience, without reducing it to something with an ‘apodictic or essential status’ 
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(McNay, 2004, p. 184). Rather, experience has to be understood as an element that 
has meaning only within the borders of a relational phenomenology. Or, if our 
identities are constituted through the impact of social regimes on our bodies, this 
impact is also dependent upon lived experience – which is not an ontological 
category, but part of what makes ‘the social’ to function in the first place. 
To make this more concrete, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus should be 
understood in temporal categories, and more precisely as an elaboration of the basic 
phenomenological idea (Husserl, 1928) that consciousness is necessarily structured 
by the presence of what has already passed-by (retention), but also by a relation of 
anticipation to what is yet-to-come (protention). Or, as McNay (2003, p. 143) 
comments: ‘Habitus, or the construction of the body within cultural norms, is 
understood not simply in unidirectional terms of the body’s retention of 
exogeneously imposed norms, but also in terms of the anticipatory  dimension of 
protention, or the living through of those norms’.  We begin to relate to the future, 
because we anticipate others’ reactions to our appearance (i.e. of (dis)approval in 
view of socially regulated norms). So, our social existence becomes temporalized at a 
practical level. And this means that the adoption of certain dispositions (e.g. a taste 
for what are ‘fashionable’ clothes) is not solely a matter of limiting our bodies’ 
potential, but that it at the same time constitutes a precondition for agency: ‘[i]t is 
this idea of the practical anticipation of the immanent tendencies of a social field 
that generates a concept of agency’ (Ibid.).  
This idea of a practically based protention is in sharp contrast with Butler’s 
theories on reiteration. The last concept lacks, according to McNay, any dynamic 
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dimension. Even if reiteration implies at first sight the opposite (as repetition 
obviously presupposes the course of time), there is no reference to temporality (Cf. 
Ibid., p. 142): reiteration concerns a ceaseless succession of the same acts, over and 
over again. If change takes place, this must always be thought as a radical 
‘disruption’ that ‘only seems to come from the outside’ (Ibid.). This is to say that 
transformation doesn’t follow from a substantial and positive intervention on behalf 
of the social actor, but only from a totally unplanned interruption of the course of 
things (the abject, the abnormal, the counter-hegemonic). Again, if what happens 
here could be called ‘agency’, it is only a characteristic of a system of signification 
and positioning that is potentially instable. Therefore, McNay argues, we have to 
oppose Butler’s symbolic determinism and take sides with Bourdieu’s social 
phenomenology, in order to conceive a genuine idea of agency – and therefore of the 
possibility of emancipation and social emancipation. 
 
Conceiving criticality within or beyond phenomenology? 
McNay’s objections to Butler’s view on criticality might be refuted in different ways. 
Diana Coole for instance argues that Butler actually does take into account much of 
what is essential to a phenomenological approach, such as the dialectic and 
inseparable interaction between matter and meaning, or the central role of lived 
experience (Coole, 2008, p. 13). Moreover, referring to Butler’s earlier work (e.g. 
Butler, 1988), she argues that notions like performativity and constructivism 
themselves can only be adequately grasped when taking phenomenology into 
account, and more precisely the ideas developed by Merleau-Ponty (1995) concerning 
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the body as simultaneously a source of meaning (i.e. a bearer of intentionality itself), 
and as a material reality that has its own history and that constrains our actions 
(i.e. a whole of ‘sedimented practices and habits’) (Coole, 2008, p. 15). Making 
exactly the opposite claim in respect to McNay’s view, it might be argued that 
phenomenology and structuralism are closely related theoretical frameworks, and 
that the real opposition should be located within the phenomenological tradition 
itself. To be more precise, the real opposition is to be found in the conflict between 
‘non-Cartesian and Cartesian versions of phenomenology’ (Ibid., p. 14), i.e. views 
that do and views that don’t take corporeality into account as constitutive for the 
meaning human action.  
Of course, Coole is not blind for the opposite ideas Butler often bluntly 
formulates in her texts published in the 90’s. But, these utterances are to be seen as 
rhetorical, meaning that (non-Cartesian) phenomenology continued to inform her 
views, even at those moments at which she seems to lean completely over to 
linguistic constructivism. However, Butler clarifies that this last characterization of 
her work is erroneous and that she has always been close to a Merleau-Pontian view 
(Cf. Ibid., p. 23). She admits not being ‘a very good materialist’ and continues: 
‘[e]very time I want to write about the body, the writing ends up being about 
language. This is not because I think that the body is reducible to language; it is not. 
Language emerges from the body […]’. And therefore: ‘performativity is not just 
about speech acts. It is also about bodily acts. The relation between the two is 
complicated, and I called it a “chiasmus” […]’. With this last expression she is 
referring to Merleau-Ponty (1995), pointing once more to the materiality of the body 
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as being a structuring force as well as a source of meaning and intentionality. 
Moreover, so Coole claims (2008, p. 25-27), Butler’s attachment to the 
phenomenological tradition returns in all clarity in her most recent work (e.g. 2005), 
in which she tries to conceptualize a non-essentialist ethics that is related to 
concrete bodily experiences of violence, exposure and loss of self-control.  
In this article, I also like to draw attention to Butler’s latest oeuvre, but I 
argue that there is no need to fall back on a phenomenological perspective in order 
conceive a Butlerian idea of critique. I think that the ideas she develops in her text 
What is Critique? (2002) precisely demonstrate the possibility of a true and effective 
form of criticality outside of the confines of a phenomenological framework. More 
specifically this can be linked to what Foucault terms ‘limit-experience’ (1991), 
meaning that (contrary to McNay) a Foucauldian-Butlerian concept of critique does 
take the experiential level into account, but (contrary to McNay and Coole) without 
any necessity to presuppose a substantial and positive account of agency. Therefore 
I first go deeper into Butler’s elaboration of Foucault’s notion of critique. 
 
Critique as a matter of virtue (rather than of judgment) 
Being a great defender of a genealogical point of view, Foucault explicitly opposes 
his own approach to any phenomenological perspective. Genealogy is a 
deconstructive reading of history that invalidates the claims of a foundational 
subject over the meaning of experience and action (a point which is central to a 
phenomenological perspective): genealogy precisely reveals that the ‘founding 
subject’ is itself a historically situated construction (Cf. Foucault, 1989; Butler, 2005, 
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p. 115). This is to say that rather than assuming the existence of a ‘transhistorical 
subject’, this subject should be placed back in a ‘history of reason’, showing that this 
presumed ground actually is no ground (Cf. Ibid.). This is to say that approaches, 
like McNay’s, which found the possibility of critique vis-à-vis a given order of things 
upon a substantial account of agency are not critical enough: although McNay 
certainly sustains that ‘the subject’ has a particular history, in her work neither the 
notion of subjectivity itself (as being constitutive of the meaning of one’s 
experiences, actions and representations), nor that of a transcendental basis of 
agency is ever put in question. 
The challenge for Foucault is then how to think criticality within a framework 
that discredits the legitimizing ground behind every critical project we have known 
since the Enlightenment. In a sense, this question concerns a very pressing issue, 
because it might be argued that precisely today a ‘trivialisation of critique’ is taking 
place (Masschelein, 2004, p. 355). This is to say that ‘autonomy and critique can no 
longer be brought to bear against the existing social order and power, but have 
become part of that order and power’ (Ibid.). Criticality is the expression of a 
historically produced power regime that no longer operates through forms of direct 
control and oppression (sovereign or biopolitical forms of power), but ‘through the 
intensification of self-reflexivity and critique’ (Ibid., p. 362). The highly cherished 
opinion that we should all be constantly self-reflective and willing to examine 
presuppositions, to diagnose our own strengths and weaknesses, to be creative and 
to decide ourselves what to believe and how to live our lives has itself become a tool 
that sustains the existing order of things, viz. the regime of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ 
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(Cf. Bröckling, 2007): social order functions optimally when everyone relates to 
him/herself as a subject interested in critically strengthening him/herself – and this 
idea itself cannot be criticized. Thus, there seems to be no ‘outside’ to the ‘system’ we 
find ourselves in (Cf. Masschelein, 2004, p. 356-357; Lyotard, 1997). In other words: 
today the very idea of emancipation as well as that of taking distance from an 
established order seems to have become utterly meaningless. 
If all this is true, what else can we do but to resign ourselves to our fate? 
However, to react in such a way is exactly what Foucault, in his famous essay What 
is Enlightenment? (1984, p. 42), describes as giving in to ‘the blackmail of the 
Enlightenment’. To escape this deadlock, Foucault proposes to take a certain 
‘attitude’ related to a critical ‘ethos’ (Ibid., p. 39). More precisely, ‘[t]his philosophical 
ethos may be characterized as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of 
rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at 
the frontiers.’ (Ibid., p. 45). Advocating the necessity of a ‘practical critique’ he 
continues to state that this kind of critique ‘will separate out, from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking 
what we are, do, or think’ (Ibid., p. 46). Instead of contenting ourselves with ‘the 
empty dream of freedom’ we should take an ‘experimental attitude’ (Ibid.). To 
unpack these claims and to argue that a true and effective, Foucauldian strategy of 
criticism is possible today, I turn to Butler’s comments (2002) on the essay from 
which these quotes are taken. 
In her essay What is Critique? An Esssay on Foucault’s Virtue Butler argues 
that what is at stake for Foucault is a politics of ‘desubjugation’ (Ibid., p. 214), being 
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her translation of ‘désasujetissement’ (Ibid., p. 220). This consists of finding a 
manner to distance ourselves from the way in which we are being subjectivized 
today – which is always also a form of subjection. More precisely, we should distance 
ourselves from the current ‘regime of truth’, i.e. the established, though contingent 
system of categorizations that regulate social life. Central to this form of critique, so 
Butler claims, is no longer the idea that this distance will be gained by passing 
judgments (the ‘gesture of rejection’, i.e. the way in which criticality has been 
defined since Modernity). It rather concerns a practical and ethical endeavor: 
Foucault’s aim is ‘to try to think the problem of freedom and, indeed, ethics in 
general, beyond judgment: critical thinking constitutes this kind of effort.’ (p. 213) 
There are two important reasons to argue for such a radical suspension of 
judgment. First, there is the logical difficulty that ‘judgmental subjectivity’, 
although it might seem to be a universal category, is in fact itself a historical 
contingency and more specifically our contemporary fate. It constitutes in Foucault’s 
words the ‘contemporary limits of the necessary’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 43). This is to 
say that we, as heirs of the Enlightenment, are inclined to define criticism in terms 
of judgment founded on principles of autonomy and self-reflection (Cf. Masschelein, 
2004, p. 364). However, this immediately precludes the possibility to take distance 
from the present situation: ‘our reigning discourse has produced an impasse’ (Butler, 
2002, p. 215). Second, there is an ethical issue. As Butler explains in greater depth 
in later texts (e.g. Butler, 2005, p. 105), to adopt a judgmental attitude testifies to 
what Adorno calls ‘moral narcissism’: even if this attitude might be self-critical 
(requiring that we disavow highly cherished, though false ideas, and that we change 
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our lives), in the end it always implies an affirmation of the safe position from which 
we pass judgment. Thus, this kind of criticism leaves our comfortable position (as 
critical subject, as sovereign judge) intact. Therefore, there is no real possibility of 
transformation. 
I go deeper into this second objection towards a judgmental attitude in the 
final section of this contribution. At this point I return to Butler’s comments on 
Foucault’s essay. What is of central importance to Foucault, Butler argues, is ‘trying 
to understand the possibility of desubjugation within rationalization without 
assuming that there is a source for resistance that is housed in the subject or 
maintained in some foundational mode’ (2002, p. 223). Rationalization refers here, 
once more, to the modern power regime that is based on the critical activity of the 
judgmental subject. In order to realize a true and effective distance to this regime 
(‘desubjugation’), a ‘moral experience’ is required that has to do with ‘self-
transformation’ rather than with ‘following objectively formulated rules or laws’ 
(2002, p. 215-216)  – such as the fundamental laws of reason prescribed by the 
Kantian critical philosophy (‘the conditions under which the use of reason is 
legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what 
may be hoped’, Foucault, 1984, p. 38 ). 
This is because there is no subjectivity that pre-exists power. Power operates 
through the very act of subjectivization itself and therefore critique always refers to 
the possibility of desubjectivization: ‘[t]o gain a critical distance from established 
authority means for Foucault not only to recognize the ways in which the coercive 
effects of knowledge are at work in subject-formation itself, but to risk one’s very 
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formation as a subject’ (Butler, 2002, p. 225). And therefore critique should certainly 
not be a matter of judgment, but a matter of virtue. Criticality, in the Foucauldian 
sense, relates to an ‘ethos’, a particular stance towards life in view of which one, on 
the one hand, is ready to leave behind any judgmental attitude and the rules and 
laws that sustain the judgmental apparatus, but also to act, on the other hand, in 
accordance with a ‘limit-attitude’: ‘critique is precisely a practice that not only 
suspends judgment […], but offers a new practice of values based on that very 
suspension’ (Ibid., p. 212). This is to say, first, that a certain ‘effort’ or a continuous 
‘work on the self’ and a ‘cultivated relation of the self to itself’ (Ibid., p. 216) are 
required: criticality is not something given (i.e. something one might discover 
through authentic self-knowledge), nor is it a matter of merely deciding to be 
critical. Second, the critical ethos that results from it refers to the willingness of 
undergoing a ‘limit-experience’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 31). But, to be sure, the 
experience that is at stake here is not the one privileged by phenomenology. Limit-
experience has ‘the task of “tearing” the subject from itself in such a way that is no 
longer the subject as such, or such that it is completely “other” than itself, so that it 
may arrive at its annihilation, its dissociation’ (Ibid.).  
As indicated above, the virtue of critique also refers to the readiness to risk 
oneself: critique is ‘experimental’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 46) in the etymologically 
original sense of the word (the Latin verb ‘experiri’ means to put oneself at risk). As 
may be clear by now, critique is not a matter of remaining within a regime of 
subjectivization (e.g. as judgmental subject accusing this regime for being 
inconsistent or hypocrite, cf. Butler, 2002, p. 220), but of transcending the very 
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parameters on the basis of which we have become subjects in the first place and by 
which we can give a coherent and intelligible account of ourselves. And so, the very 
continuity of our ‘self’ is always put at risk. Nevertheless, I should add here that in 
spite of the emphasis Butler lays on this dimension of desubjectivization in her 
reading of Foucault, it should not be understood as a plea for anarchism or as an 
expression of the utopian yearning that we might actually escape power (i.e. the 
working of discursive apparatuses): ‘[t]he question “how not to be governed?” is 
always the question of how not to be governed in this or that way. But this is not a 
question of not to be governed at all.’ (Butler, 2009b, p. 786). Again, this ‘empty 
dream of freedom’ (Foucault 1984, p. 46) misses the point of what critique is: it only 
gives us the delusory feeling to be on the outside of power, whilst it is most likely 
that our subjectivity is defined (without being conscious of it) in terms of yet another 
truth regime, viz. one that constitutes us in (romantic) categories of purity and 
authenticity. To recall Foucault’s remark to mind: ‘We have to move beyond the 
outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers.’ (Ibid., p. 45). The aim is 
not to regain a more authentic self and to realize full control over our lives, but to be 
willing to go through a limit-experience. This however demands effort and the 
willingness to endure discomfort. Hence the need of an ‘ethos’. 
 
‘Being beside ourselves’ as a critical experience 
To elaborate more concretely the idea that limit-experience constitutes a site of 
criticality, I turn to Butler’s latest oeuvre (2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2009a). Here she 
reflects on social and ethical matters from the perspective of corporeal experience. 
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Referring to the work of Adriana Cavarero, Butler emphasizes that there is more to 
social existence than the mediation of norms: ‘as a being [who is] constituted bodily 
in the public sphere […] I am exposed and singular, and this is as much a part of my 
publicity, if not my sociality, as is the way I become recognizable through the 
operation of norms’ (Butler 2005, p. 33). This is to say that social existence is never 
solely a matter of encountering others on the basis of certain attributes or 
characteristics – i.e. interacting (or not) with one another according to identities and 
roles regulated by an existing regime (whiteness, blackness, straightness, 
queerness, etc.). Social existence is above all a bodily experience – and more 
precisely one of being ‘given over’ to one another, i.e. a form of ‘exposure’ that finally 
escapes our control. Therefore, Butler argues, we should  focus on the inescapable 
vulnerability that comes along with our embodied condition (clearly present in 
situations of injury and violation). Consequentially, she draws attention to a radical 
passivity that is not the result of our dependency on discursive regimes (as she 
abundantly demonstrated in her earlier work), but rather of the frailty of our flesh. 
Due to corporeal vulnerability we are all reciprocally exposed to others’ harm and 
care: ‘[i]f I am wounded, I find that the wound testifies to the fact that I am 
impressionable, given over to the other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control’ 
(Butler, 2005, p. 84) 
In this way the body reenters the scene, but no longer as the non-decidable 
site of performative self-constitution: now it appears as a dimension of opacity, a site 
of expropriation of the self. As corporeal beings ‘we are not only constituted by our 
relations [with others] but also dispossessed by them as well’ (Butler, 2004a, p. 24). 
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A careful analysis of experiences such as desire, grief and indignation illustrates 
this point. For instance, the experience of losing someone whom one was attached to 
clearly shows that we are but who we are thanks to our bond to a particular other. 
The grief we feel, which is always a heavily embodied emotion, follows from the fact 
that what singularises us has to do with the uncontrollability of our social relations. 
As she explains: ‘grief contains within it the possibility of apprehending the 
fundamental sociality of embodied life, the ways in which we are from the start, and 
by virtue of being a bodily being, already given over, beyond ourselves, implicated in 
lives that are not our own’ (Butler, 2004b, p. 22, italics added). Something similar 
might occur when one is beside oneself with anger and indignation because one 
belongs to a socially or politically marginalized group. Butler argues that we 
shouldn’t try to reduce this experience to the desire for a society that safeguards the 
possibility for every individual to be respected in her own subjective rights. This 
liberal and legalist vision, frequently shared by feminists and partisans of gay 
emancipation movements, misses the point: ‘it does not do justice to passion and 
grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, 
undo us, implicate us in lives that are not our own, irreversibly, if not fatally’ 
(Butler, 2004a, p. 25). We would better take this bodily experience seriously, i.e. as 
literally ‘being outside ourselves’. It concerns a ‘disposition of ourselves outside 
ourselves [that] seems to follow from bodily life, from its vulnerability and its 
exposure’ (Ibid.). And so, the sense of resistance against an existing social or 
political order is not founded upon a rationalist or individualistic ethics, but refers 
to the experience of corporeal vulnerability i.e. the ‘precariousness of life’. 
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In these examples we are ‘transported beyond ourselves’ (Ibid., p. 24) and 
undergo ‘in our flesh’ a moment of self-dispossession: we are radically out-of-
position, whether we like it or not. This implies that ‘the body has its invariably 
public dimension’ (Ibid., p. 26, italics added). When mourning or being outraged we 
can no longer claim to appropriate our existence as a private affair: ‘as bodies, we 
are always something more than, and other than, ourselves’ (Butler, 2004b, p. 25). 
And so, bodily experiences during which we lose control over the meaning of our 
lives, might constitute ‘limit-experiences’, in the Foucauldian sense.  
At this point an important objection might be raised. If bodily exposure has an 
‘invariable’ quality, why does Butler’s appeal to the ‘flesh’ constitute a difference: 
after all, if it concerns a dimension of human life that is ‘inescapable’, why is it 
necessary to draw attention to this condition and why should it become the object of 
virtuous self-exercise? I think this objection should be countered in two ways. First, 
Butler wants to make the point that as a rule we are inclined to adopt an attitude 
towards our existence which precludes the possibility to be dispossessed by our 
bodily entanglement with the other-than-ourselves. Coming back to the sense of the 
rage and grief oppressed people might feel, Butler claims that the most common 
reaction in fact protects us against a corporeal experience of self-loss.  This is not to 
say that the usual way in which lesbians and gays frame their claims is without 
good grounds, but that another answer to this situation of insjustice is immediately 
precluded: ‘[w]hen we argue for protection against discrimination […] we have to 
present ourselves as bounded beings – distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects 
before the law, a community defined by some shared features.’ (Ibid., p. 24) As such 
26 
 
it could even be said that a legalist perspective on these matters immunizes 
ourselves against the possibility of ‘limit-experience’. Therefore we need to cultivate 
virtue, in the sense that we have to work on an appropriate attitude, viz. a way of 
living which allows for the precariousness of life.  
It think it is of the greatest importance to oppose this willingness to accept in 
our lives this corporeal sense of self-loss to the idea that we should acknowledge  a 
basic ontological condition and that we should draw the logical conclusions. And so I 
come to my second counter-argument against the criticism that Butler’s 
vulnerability-approach makes no difference: what is at stake here is not that we 
come to agree with a ‘relational view of the self’ (Ibid.). If this were the case, then 
indeed it would suffice to become conscious of our entanglement with and exposure 
to others in order to generate social and political change. This would mean, however, 
that Butler eventually clings to a judgmental perspective: confronted with the truth 
about human existence (viz. that it is fundamentally relational), we have to accept 
another truth: from now on we must resist any political order that goes against 
humankind’s social essence. Nonetheless, as I have tried to make clear, Butler’s 
views are radically opposed to this. The point is not to accept a truth, but to be 
willing to undergo an experience. And Butler specifies that this ‘has to do with 
agreeing to undergo a transformation (perhaps one should say submitting to a 
transformation) the full result of which one cannot know in advance’ (Butler, 2004a, 
p. 21. italics in original). 
To make more concrete how the possibility of resistance and transformation is 
dependent on corporeal experience of self-loss - rather than on a firm judgment the 
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subject makes - I turn once more to a remark Butler makes in connection with 
Foucault’s idea of criticality. Foucault stages the figure of the 19th Century poet 
Charles Baudelaire as an example of the virtue of critique. This is more precisely 
because his ‘ethos’ consisted in practising the art of the flâneur, i.e. reaching a 
stance in life in which judgment is fully suspended by merely sauntering the streets 
– displaying a profound attention for whatever crosses the poet’s path (rather than a 
priori defining what is of interest and thus deserves attention). Butler however 
suggests that Walter Benjamin’s image of the anonymous existence within the 
crowd is an even more apt incarnation of a critical attitude: we should imagine ‘that 
the operation of critique emerges neither from a radically unconditioned freedom nor 
from a radical act of individual will, but from a kind of jostling that happens in the 
midst of social life, the very scene of being impinged upon by those we do not know.’ 
(Butler 2009b, p. 795). The praxis of the flâneur, even if it is concerned with 
transcending a judgmental perspective, is still too much modelled on the modern, 
individualist conception of subjectivity and therefore not critical enough.  
When finding ourselves amidst a mass of (unknown) bodies, however, we fully 
coincide with the corporeal side of life (we are entirely ‘flesh’ so to speak) and are 
literally beside ourselves. These experiences preclude any possibility to stick to the 
narcissistic position of the sovereign judgmental subject (founded upon a loyalty to 
its own essence as rational and autonomous being), nor to that of the 
‘entrepreneurial’ self (who appropriates criticality as a means for a strengthening of 
her own self). Moreover, these experiences invalidate any ordering of communal life 
on the basis of identity and position. This is because we are just bodies, and thus 
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completely out-of-position in our ‘exposition’ to one another. As bodies we find 
ourselves at a distance from the current ordering of society (which always demands 
a clear ordering according to identities and positions).  
This of course implies that we look in another way at criticality and the 
possibilities for resistance against the existing societal and political order than we 
are used to. I think that Butler, in claiming this, comes close to what Giorgio 
Agamben, another philosopher greatly influenced by Foucault, suggests in 
connection with the ‘coming politics’ or ‘whatever being’ ‘(Agamben, 2005). Agamben 
shows himself to be an opponent of any ‘identity politics’. Real ‘cracks’ in the 
existing societal order do not appear when oppressed or marginalized groups of 
people stand up for themselves and strive for a recognition of their identity (as 
queer, as disabled, etc.). This is because the political regime can ultimately 
‘recognize any claim for identity’ (Ibid., p. 86): including people on the basis of 
clearly defined and substantive identities (and specific needs and interest that are 
linked to these identities) is the very basis of the existing political apparatus. 
Therefore, the only thing that really threatens the current regime is a reaction 
against the established order that is not correlating to specific demands. 
More positively spoken, this refusal, or even transcending, of any care for 
identity concerns the verification of another sort of communal existence which is not 
mediated by something one has in common, but that corresponds to an ‘immediate 
life experience’ (See Edkins, 2007). As Agamben advanced these ideas in the 90’s, 
the ‘case’ he has in mind is the protest against the Chinese government at 
Tiananmen Square, which was (according to his reading) neither motivated by the 
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question for concrete recognition of needs or interests, nor supported by a 
community of people that shares a clear identity. More recently the Indignados 
Protest Movement and the Arab Spring Uprisings might form cases in point. These 
events have the force to bring together people from all walks of life, without a clear 
political program (which, however, doesn’t prevent that after the fact these protests 
often get linked to concrete political demands and therefore privatized by groups 
with a precise political agenda). Moreover, although this revolt could only have come 
about thanks to social media, it is also unthinkable without the physical assembling 
of thousands and thousands of people. It seems as if the anonymous corporeal 
experience Butler refers to in her comments on the flâneur grants the possibility of a 
genuine form of resistance. This might be because during such events we are first of 
all gathered as bodies  - and only as bodies: hence there is no interest in identity or 
social position whatsoever. As such any established societal and political order is 
being invalidated (because any such order relies on the willingness to  relate to one 
another on the basis of clear similarities and differences in identity and position).  
More positively formulated, a completely ‘new’ and unforeseeable future (i.e. future 
forms of living together that are not necessarily conditioned by the categories that 
are in operation in the present) becomes possible.  
In sum, this would mean that, contrary to what McNay argues, a true and 
effective mode of criticality and resistance can be conceived within a Foucauldian-
Butlerian frame of thought. Thus, there is no need to have recourse to more 
substantial views on agency, nor to a phenomenological concept of experience. 
Taking a critical ethos and opening oneself to the possibility of limit-experience 
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constitute in and of themselves an opening towards a future individual and social 
life that can be radically different.  
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